Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions (Q4446339)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2032550
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| English | Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2032550 |
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Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions (English)
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22 March 2004
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tests
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static prediction
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0.8096966743469238
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0.7967642545700073
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0.7946131229400635
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0.7938269972801208
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0.7865039706230164
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