A NONPARAMETRIC TEST FOR COMPARING VALUATION DISTRIBUTIONS IN FIRST‐PRICE AUCTIONS
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Publication:5370535
DOI10.1111/IERE.12238zbMATH Open1403.91175OpenAlexW2753221394MaRDI QIDQ5370535FDOQ5370535
Publication date: 20 October 2017
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12238
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Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Order statistics; empirical distribution functions (62G30) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cited In (14)
- Estimation and inference of seller's expected revenue in first-price auctions
- Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Identification of participation constraints in contracts
- Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
- Order statistics approaches to unobserved heterogeneity in auctions
- Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
- Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator
- Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions
- Two results on auctions with endogenous entry
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