Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
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Publication:553869
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.03.010zbMATH Open1217.91074OpenAlexW1965791594MaRDI QIDQ553869FDOQ553869
Authors: Sandra Orozco-Alemán, Felix Munoz-Garcia 
Publication date: 28 July 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010
Recommendations
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
- Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
- Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204533
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
Cites Work
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
Cited In (3)
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