Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
From MaRDI portal
Publication:553869
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010zbMath1217.91074MaRDI QIDQ553869
Sandra Orozco-Alemán, Felix Munoz-Garcia
Publication date: 28 July 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Cites Work
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction