Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.03.010MaRDI QIDQ553869zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandra Orozco-Alemán, Felix Munoz-Garcia

Publication date 28 July 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionfirst-price auctionsasymmetrically informed biddersunknown valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
• Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204533
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders

Cites work

• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders

Cited in

(3)

• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry
• Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values

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