Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.06.004zbMath1236.91083OpenAlexW2018752076MaRDI QIDQ2427846

Nora Szech

Publication date: 18 April 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationauctionsinformation costsinformation release

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
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• The value of information for auctioneers
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• Comparing location experiments
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• Optimal search auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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