Mathematical Research Data Initiative
Main page
Recent changes
Random page
SPARQL
MaRDI@GitHub
New item
Special pages
In other projects
MaRDI portal item
Discussion
View source
View history
English
Log in

Insider trading under discreteness

From MaRDI portal
Publication:3094331
Jump to:navigation, search

DOI10.1142/S0219024911006528zbMATH Open1283.91129MaRDI QIDQ3094331FDOQ3094331


Authors: Massimo Scotti Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 24 October 2011

Published in: International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)





Recommendations

  • Insider Trading without Normality
  • On pricing rules and optimal strategies in general Kyle-Back models
  • scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1827979
  • Strategic insider trading equilibrium: a filter theory approach
  • Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading


zbMATH Keywords

market microstructureequilibrium multiplicitystrategic tradingKyle's model


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic growth models (91B62)


Cites Work

  • Insider Trading without Normality
  • On the existence of linear equilibria in models of market making


Cited In (6)

  • Viable insider markets
  • Title not available (Why is that?)
  • Weak Insider Trading and Behavioral Finance
  • Insider trading in the Hong Kong stock market
  • The insider's curse
  • Insider Trading without Normality





This page was built for publication: Insider trading under discreteness

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3094331)

Retrieved from "https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/w/index.php?title=Publication:3094331&oldid=16165326"
Tools
What links here
Related changes
Printable version
Permanent link
Page information
This page was last edited on 3 February 2024, at 21:49. Warning: Page may not contain recent updates.
Privacy policy
About MaRDI portal
Disclaimers
Imprint
Powered by MediaWiki