Using Trembling-Hand Perfection to Alleviate the Interlinked Principal-Agent Problem

DOI10.2307/3440314MaRDI QIDQ3809548zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Beth Allen

Publication date 1988

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3440314

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriamoral hazardmarket mechanismsimple interlinked principal-agent problemtrembling-hand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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(3)

• Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
• Work quality and optimal pay structure: Piece vs. hourly rates in employee remuneration
• The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games

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