The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00372-4zbMath0978.91023MaRDI QIDQ5940739

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Sequential auctions with delay costs. A two-period model

Cites Work

• Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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