Prediction and welfare in ad auctions

DOI10.1007/S00224-016-9679-ZMaRDI QIDQ506530zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mukund Sundararajan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Publication date 1 February 2017

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-016-9679-z

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrearrangement inequalitysponsored search auctionsPareto frontierrevenue optimizationvirtual values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Prediction and welfare in ad auctions
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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Ad auctions with data
• AdWords and generalized online matching
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Auction Design
• Prediction and welfare in ad auctions
• Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
• Sponsored search auctions
• The effectiveness of English auctions.

Cited in

(3)

• Ad auctions with data
• Robust causal inference for incremental return on ad spend with randomized paired geo experiments
• Prediction and welfare in ad auctions

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