Communication of preferences in contests for contracts

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0525-2zbMath1262.91084OpenAlexW2094188092WikidataQ57920628 ScholiaQ57920628MaRDI QIDQ690687

Todd R. Kaplan

Publication date: 28 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0525-2

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcontestsprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (4)

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

Cites Work

• Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Why banks should keep secrets
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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