Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0391-9zbMath1307.91089OpenAlexW2071977486MaRDI QIDQ2248914

Cuihong Fan, Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Byoung Heon Jun

Publication date: 27 June 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w1010.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinnovationlicensingpatentsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions

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