An NTU value under complement reduced game
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Publication:532674
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0155-8zbMATH Open1211.91038OpenAlexW1975351529MaRDI QIDQ532674FDOQ532674
Authors: Yan-An Hwang 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0155-8
Recommendations
- Natural extensions of the complement reduction and the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
- The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5569959
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
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- The bargaining problem
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- Stability and the Nash solution
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions
- An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
- A Note on Wallis' Bounds Test and Negative Autocorrelation
Cited In (4)
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