Recommendations
- Natural extensions of the complement reduction and the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
- The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
- An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5569959
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48311 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on Wallis' Bounds Test and Negative Autocorrelation
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Stability and the Nash solution
- The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions
- The bargaining problem
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
Cited in
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