An arbitrary starting tracing procedure for computing subgame perfect equilibria
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Cites work
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- An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium
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- Game theory
- General equilibrium models and homotopy methods
- Homotopies for computation of fixed points
- How to select a solution in generalized Nash equilibrium problems
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- Introduction to Numerical Continuation Methods
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Noncooperative Stochastic Games
- Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
- The Approximation of Fixed Points of a Continuous Mapping
- Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure
Cited in
(7)- A differentiable path-following method to compute subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies in robust stochastic games and its applications
- An Interior-Point Differentiable Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
- The computation of pairwise stable networks
- The Logarithmic Stochastic Tracing Procedure: A Homotopy Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria of Stochastic Games
- Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games
- Variants of Harsanyi's tracing procedures for selecting a perfect stationary equilibrium in stochastic games
- Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in N-person games
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