An arbitrary starting tracing procedure for computing subgame perfect equilibria
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Publication:2194134
DOI10.1007/s10957-020-01703-zzbMath1447.91017OpenAlexW3037631136MaRDI QIDQ2194134
Publication date: 25 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-020-01703-z
subgame perfect equilibriumnoncooperative stochastic gameslinear tracing procedurearbitrary starting
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
Related Items (3)
An Interior-Point Differentiable Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games ⋮ The computation of pairwise stable networks ⋮ A differentiable path-following method to compute subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies in robust stochastic games and its applications
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