Monotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregation
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.05.007zbMATH Open1415.91058OpenAlexW2619684902MaRDI QIDQ1680738FDOQ1680738
Authors: Mehdi Shadmehr, Dan Bernhardt
Publication date: 16 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88532/7/WRAP-Nonmonotone-bounded-game-Bernhardt-2017.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
- Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
- Monotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregation
- Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
Cited In (6)
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Extremism in revolutionary movements
- Monotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregation
- Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
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