Monotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregation
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Cites work
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- A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
- Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
- Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
- Monotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregation
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
Cited in
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- Extremism in revolutionary movements
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