Optimal regional insurance provision: do federal transfers complement local debt?
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Publication:2163091
Recommendations
- Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality
- Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government.
- Fiscal federalism and interstate risk sharing: empirical evidence from Germany.
Cites work
- Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- Inter-jurisdiction migration and the fiscal policies of local governments
- Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
Cited in
(4)- Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality
- Fiscal federalism and interstate risk sharing: empirical evidence from Germany.
- Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity
- Interregional spillovers and optimal budget institutions under asymmetric information
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