Inter-jurisdiction migration and the fiscal policies of local governments

DOI10.1007/S00712-020-00715-7MaRDI QIDQ2056862zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Darong Dai, Dennis W. Jansen, Liqun Liu

Publication date 8 December 2021

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00715-7

zbMATH Keywords

debt limitsfiscal externalitieslocal government debtmigration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good
• Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality
• Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments

Cited in

(3)

• Optimal regional insurance provision: do federal transfers complement local debt?
• Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality
• Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity

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