Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.07.001MaRDI QIDQ607266zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra, Frans van Winden

Publication date 19 November 2010

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=excen_workingpapers

zbMATH Keywords

electoral competitioninterest groupsspatial voting modelswinning set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

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Cites work

• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation

Cited in

(2)

• A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition
• Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic partial equilibrium model

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