Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.07.001zbMATH Open1200.91090OpenAlexW2111875180MaRDI QIDQ607266FDOQ607266

Authors: Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra, Frans van Winden 

Publication date: 19 November 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=excen_workingpapers

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zbMATH Keywords

electoral competitioninterest groupsspatial voting modelswinning set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation

Cited In (2)

• Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic partial equilibrium model
• A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition

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