Dynamic games with asymmetric information: a framework for empirical work
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Publication:4962986
DOI10.1093/QJE/QJS025zbMATH Open1400.91305OpenAlexW2164499305MaRDI QIDQ4962986FDOQ4962986
Authors: Chaim Fershtman, Ariel Pakes
Publication date: 6 November 2018
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs025
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- Asymmetric information in a capital accumulation differential game with spillover and learning effects
- On the value of non-Markovian Dynkin games with partial and asymmetric information
- The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
- A differentiable path-following method to compute subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies in robust stochastic games and its applications
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