On blocking coalitions: linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.01.003zbMath1162.91465OpenAlexW2095607591MaRDI QIDQ2457252

Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber, Akira Yamazaki

Publication date: 30 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityWalrasian allocationsBlocking coalitionsbounded distance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour ⋮ Restricted Coalition Formation

Cites Work

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• The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies
• Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at Pareto allocations
• A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure
• Edgeworth's conjecture in economies with a continuum of agents and commodities
• A note on the core equivalence theorem
• Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
• An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem
• Edgeworth-Allocations in an Exchange Economy with Many Traders
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• The Core of an Economy with a Measure Space of Economic Agents
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Measuring the set of blocking coalitions in infinite dimensional economies

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