A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90026-5zbMath0499.90010OpenAlexW2029561930MaRDI QIDQ1171976

Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90026-5

zbMATH Keywords

communication structureblocking coalitionPareto optimal allocationcore equivalence theorempartition of the set of agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (9)

Restricted Coalition Formation ⋮ Communication in markets. A suggested approach ⋮ On blocking coalitions: linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind ⋮ Bargaining power in communication networks ⋮ The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies ⋮ Core allocations and the dimension of the cone of efficiency price vectors ⋮ The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies ⋮ The core of the inductive limit of a direct system of economies with a communication structure ⋮ On the Edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive economies with restricted coalitions

Cites Work

• A note on the core equivalence theorem
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables

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