Distributions of centrality on networks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.03.008MaRDI QIDQ2195685zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Krishna Dasaratha

Publication date 27 August 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.10402

zbMATH Keywords

centralityinequalitynetworkspeer effectssegregationsocial networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Abstract: We provide a framework for determining the centralities of agents in a broad family of random networks. Current understanding of network centrality is largely restricted to deterministic settings, but practitioners frequently use random network models to accommodate data limitations or prove asymptotic results. Our main theorems show that on large random networks, centrality measures are close to their expected values with high probability. We illustrate the economic consequences of these results by presenting three applications: (1) In network formation models based on community structure (called stochastic block models), we show network segregation and differences in community size produce inequality. Benefits from peer effects tend to accrue disproportionately to bigger and better-connected communities. (2) When link probabilities depend on geography, we can compute and compare the centralities of agents in different locations. (3) In models where connections depend on several independent characteristics, we give a formula that determines centralities 'characteristic-by-characteristic'. The basic techniques from these applications, which use the main theorems to reduce questions about random networks to deterministic calculations, extend to many network games.

Review text

This paper studies agent centrality in a large random network, where links of the network are generated independently and the link probabilities are governed by a matrix \(\bar{A}\) with element \(\bar{A}_{ij}\) being the probability of having an edge \(ij\). For networks with \(n\) agents, suppose \(A(n)\) is a sequence of random networks that has non-vanishing spectral gap and has large enough eigenvalues. For \(\varepsilon>0\), it is shown that with probability at least \(1-\varepsilon\) the matrix \(A(n)\) has a unique largest eigenvalue \(\lambda_1(n)\) and the eigenvector centralities \(v(A(n))\) satisfy \(\|v(A(n))-v(\bar{A}(n))\|_2\le \varepsilon\) for all large \(n\). Moreover, suppose \(\phi(n)\) is a sequence of constants such that \(\limsup_n\phi(n)\bar{\lambda}_1(n)<1\). It is shown that with probability at least \(1-\varepsilon\) the vectors of Katz-Bonacich centralities satisfy \(\|c(A(n),\phi(n))-c(\bar{A}(n),\phi(n))\|_2\le\varepsilon\sqrt{n}\) for all large \(n\). These results are applied to relate homophily and inequality of outcomes, the influence of link probabilities on homophily, as well as relative inequality of outcome called Lorenz dominance. Some discussions about the segregation and geography in economy behavior through the developed framework are presented.

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Cited in

(13)

• Measuring centrality by a generalization of degree
• On the distribution of betweenness centrality in random trees
• A graph theoretic analysis of leverage centrality
• The cost of segregation in (social) networks
• Link investment substitutability: a factor influencing network formation
• Core and periphery in networks
• Rethinking centrality: the role of dynamical processes in social network analysis
• A dynamical systems view of network centrality
• Centrality measures in networks
• Degree centrality and root finding in growing random networks
• Graphon games: a statistical framework for network games and interventions
• Contagion and equilibria in diversified financial networks
• Optimal influence design in networks

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