Effort Games and the Price of Myopia

DOI10.1002/MALQ.200810018MaRDI QIDQ3392306zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date 14 August 2009

Published in Mathematical Logic Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/malq.200810018

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamesprincipal agenteffort games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Complexity of computation (including implicit computational complexity) (03D15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its Applications
• A course in game theory.
• A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies

Cited in

(6)

• Incentives and efficiency in uncertain collaborative environments
• Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
• Efficient algorithms for game-theoretic betweenness centrality
• Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
• Cost and complexity of harnessing games with payments
• Contribution games in networks

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