Effort Games and the Price of Myopia

DOI10.1002/malq.200810018zbMath1173.91304OpenAlexW2114439854MaRDI QIDQ3392306

Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date: 14 August 2009

Published in: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/malq.200810018

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamesprincipal agenteffort games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Complexity of computation (including implicit computational complexity) (03D15) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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Cites Work

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• A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
• A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its Applications
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games

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