Effort Games and the Price of Myopia

DOI10.1002/MALQ.200810018zbMATH Open1173.91304OpenAlexW2114439854MaRDI QIDQ3392306FDOQ3392306

Authors: Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein 

Publication date: 14 August 2009

Published in: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/malq.200810018

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zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamesprincipal agenteffort games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Complexity of computation (including implicit computational complexity) (03D15)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A course in game theory.
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
• A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its Applications

Cited In (6)

• Incentives and efficiency in uncertain collaborative environments
• Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
• Efficient algorithms for game-theoretic betweenness centrality
• Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
• Cost and complexity of harnessing games with payments
• Contribution games in networks

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