Effort Games and the Price of Myopia

DOI10.1002/MALQ.200810018MaRDI QIDQ3392306zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date 14 August 2009

Published in Mathematical Logic Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/malq.200810018

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gameseffort gamesprincipal agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Complexity of computation (including implicit computational complexity) (03D15) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games
• A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its Applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies

Cited in

(6)

• Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
• Contribution games in networks
• Cost and complexity of harnessing games with payments
• Incentives and efficiency in uncertain collaborative environments
• Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
• Efficient algorithms for game-theoretic betweenness centrality

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