Contribution Games in Social Networks
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Publication:3586459
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-15775-2_14zbMATH Open1287.91124arXiv1004.1854OpenAlexW2106526918MaRDI QIDQ3586459FDOQ3586459
Authors: Elliot Anshelevich, Martin Hoefer
Publication date: 6 September 2010
Published in: Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a relationship will flourish or drown, and to measure the success we use a reward function for each relationship. Every agent is trying to maximize the reward from all relationships that it is involved in. We consider pairwise equilibria of this game, and characterize the existence, computational complexity, and quality of equilibrium based on the types of reward functions involved. For example, when all reward functions are concave, we prove that the price of anarchy is at most 2. For convex functions the same only holds under some special but very natural conditions. A special focus of the paper are minimum effort games, where the reward of a relationship depends only on the minimum effort of any of the participants. Finally, we show tight bounds for approximate equilibria and convergence of dynamics in these games.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.1854
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