Correlated Nash equilibrium
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Publication:1007328
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.06.006zbMATH Open1157.91404OpenAlexW1996231693MaRDI QIDQ1007328FDOQ1007328
Authors: Kin Chung Lo 
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.006
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ambiguityNash equilibriumcorrelated equilibriummaxmin expected utilitystochastic independencemultiple priorsagreeing to disagreeepistemic conditionsknightian uncertainty
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Cited In (12)
- Optimism and pessimism in games
- The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity
- Ellsberg games
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
- Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
- Correlated equilibrium and potential games
- Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
- Improving Nash by coarse correlation
- Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
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