Equilibria for games with combined qualitative and quantitative objectives

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Publication:824280

DOI10.1007/S00236-020-00385-4zbMATH Open1483.68193arXiv2008.05643OpenAlexW3034407568MaRDI QIDQ824280FDOQ824280


Authors: Julian Gutiérrez, Aniello Murano, Giuseppe Perelli, Sasha Rubin, Thomas Steeples, M. J. Wooldridge Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 15 December 2021

Published in: Acta Informatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act independently and strategically in pursuit of personal preferences. In this article, we study these games in the context of finite-memory strategies, and we assume players' preferences are defined by a qualitative and a quantitative objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its qualitative objective (given as a formula of Linear Temporal Logic) and then prefers to minimise costs (given by a mean-payoff function). Our main result is that deciding the existence of a strict epsilon Nash equilibrium in such games is 2ExpTime-complete (and hence decidable), even if players' deviations are implemented as infinite-memory strategies.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.05643




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