Incentive engineering for Boolean games
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2012.11.003zbMATH Open1270.68340OpenAlexW2040148146MaRDI QIDQ360136FDOQ360136
Authors: M. J. Wooldridge, Ulle Endriss, Sarit Kraus, Jérôme Lang 
Publication date: 26 August 2013
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370212001518
Recommendations
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)
Cited In (19)
- Boolean Game with Prioritized Norms
- Equilibria for games with combined qualitative and quantitative objectives
- Łukasiewicz games: a logic-based approach to quantitative strategic interactions
- Discrete preference games with logic-based agents: formal framework, complexity, and islands of tractability
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulating games by sharing information
- Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors
- Hard and soft preparation sets in Boolean games
- Norm-based mechanism design
- Optimizing over serial dictatorships
- Incentive Engineering for Concurrent Games
- Partial order games
- From model checking to equilibrium checking: reactive modules for rational verification
- Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games
- Existence and verification of Nash equilibria in non-cooperative contribution games with resource contention
- Behavioural strategies in weighted Boolean games
- Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games
- Boolean games with currency
- Partial-order Boolean games: informational independence in a logic-based model of strategic interaction
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