Dependencies between players in Boolean games

DOI10.1016/J.IJAR.2009.02.008zbMATH Open1186.91018OpenAlexW2049931186MaRDI QIDQ962907FDOQ962907

Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex, Jérôme Lang, Elise Bonzon

Publication date: 7 April 2010

Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2009.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryproblem decompositioncompact preference representation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Classical propositional logic (03B05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
• On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
• Another perspective on default reasoning
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Cited In (10)

• Boolean Game with Prioritized Norms
• Iterated Boolean games
• Manipulating games by sharing information
• Hard and soft preparation sets in Boolean games
• Weighted Boolean Formula Games
• Partial order games
• Simulating cardinal preferences in Boolean games: a proof technique
• Twenty-Five Years of Preferred Subtheories
• Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games
• Partial-order Boolean games: informational independence in a logic-based model of strategic interaction

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