Simulating cardinal preferences in Boolean games: a proof technique
DOI10.1016/J.IC.2017.09.008zbMATH Open1395.68256OpenAlexW2795410054MaRDI QIDQ1641024FDOQ1641024
Authors: Egor Ianovski, Luke Ong 
Publication date: 14 June 2018
Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:48f08657-4077-4cd9-b6af-8b86ab6ab771
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Cited In (3)
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