Individual and social learning

DOI10.1007/S10614-005-9003-5zbMATH Open1122.91308OpenAlexW2025516658MaRDI QIDQ2432012FDOQ2432012

Nobuyuki Hanaki

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10614-006-9055-1

Recommendations

• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• An adaptive learning model in coordination games
• Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
• Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
• On learning to cooperate.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
• An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games

Cited In (8)

• Social learning and the shadow of the past
• An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• HOW INDIVIDUALS LEARN TO TAKE TURNS: EMERGENCE OF ALTERNATING COOPERATION IN A CONGESTION GAME AND THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
• Multidimensional Social Learning
• A computational approach to the collective action problem: Assessment of alternative learning rules
• Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
• Properties of learning models in collective action: Rationality of backward-looking players

This page was built for publication: Individual and social learning

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2432012)