Simultaneous Penalization and Subsidization for Stabilizing Grand Cooperation

DOI10.1287/opre.2018.1723zbMath1455.91026OpenAlexW2883680162MaRDI QIDQ4971567

Lindong Liu, Zhou Xu, Xiangtong Qi

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fed2a35ab9d90989b81c3c4b80211399e617225a

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamegrand coalition stabilityparallel machine scheduling gamesimultaneous penalization and subsidization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05)

Related Items (2)

Lagrangian heuristic for simultaneous subsidization and penalization: implementations on rooted travelling salesman games ⋮ On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource

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