Simultaneous Penalization and Subsidization for Stabilizing Grand Cooperation

Cites Work

Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game
On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
Cost Allocation for Joint Replenishment Models
Complexity of core allocation for the bin packing game
Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
The Cost Allocation Problem for the First Order Interaction Joint Replenishment Model
Coordination of Outsourced Operations at a Third-Party Facility Subject to Booking, Overtime, and Tardiness Costs
Stable coalition structures with externalities
New techniques for cost sharing in combinatorial optimization games
Sharing Supermodular Costs
Core-based cost allocation in the cooperative traveling salesman problem
Computing Near-Optimal Stable Cost Allocations for Cooperative Games by Lagrangian Relaxation
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
On the core of a traveling salesman cost allocation game
A cooperative location game based on the 1-center location problem
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
Matching Games: The Least Core and the Nucleolus
Inventory Centralization Games with Price-Dependent Demand and Quantity Discount
Cooperative games in facility location situations with regional fixed costs
Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs

Cited In (4)

An incentive compatible ZD strategy-based data sharing model for federated learning: a perspective of iterated prisoner's dilemma
On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource
Lagrangian heuristic for simultaneous subsidization and penalization: implementations on rooted travelling salesman games
Algorithmic solutions for maximizing shareable costs

This page was built for publication: Simultaneous Penalization and Subsidization for Stabilizing Grand Cooperation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4971567)