Sharing supermodular costs
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Publication:3098296
Recommendations
- Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
- Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
- Computing Shapley Value in Supermodular Coalitional Games
- Note on the computational complexity of least core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games.
- Some Results in Cost Allocation Games
Cited in
(11)- Lagrangian heuristic for simultaneous subsidization and penalization: implementations on rooted travelling salesman games
- Algorithmic solutions for maximizing shareable costs
- Computing near-optimal stable cost allocations for cooperative games by Lagrangian relaxation
- Simultaneous penalization and subsidization for stabilizing grand cooperation
- An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
- Computing payoff allocations in the approximate core of linear programming games in a privacy-preserving manner
- Capacity allocation games without an initial sequence
- Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
- Stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences
- Finding the nucleoli of large cooperative games
- Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
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