Sharing supermodular costs
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Publication:3098296
DOI10.1287/OPRE.1100.0841zbMATH Open1232.91033OpenAlexW2149924219MaRDI QIDQ3098296FDOQ3098296
Authors: Andreas S. Schulz, Nelson A. Uhan
Publication date: 17 November 2011
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.174.1058
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Cited In (11)
- Simultaneous penalization and subsidization for stabilizing grand cooperation
- Lagrangian heuristic for simultaneous subsidization and penalization: implementations on rooted travelling salesman games
- An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
- Stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences
- Finding the nucleoli of large cooperative games
- Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
- Algorithmic solutions for maximizing shareable costs
- Computing payoff allocations in the approximate core of linear programming games in a privacy-preserving manner
- Capacity allocation games without an initial sequence
- Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
- Computing near-optimal stable cost allocations for cooperative games by Lagrangian relaxation
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