Strategic bidding in an accumulating priority queue: equilibrium analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:512949
DOI10.1007/S10479-016-2141-4zbMATH Open1357.90034arXiv1510.03575OpenAlexW2736652627MaRDI QIDQ512949FDOQ512949
Authors: Moshe Haviv, Liron Ravner 
Publication date: 3 March 2017
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in exchange. The priority of each customer in the queue is a linear function of the individual waiting time, with the purchased coefficient being the slope. The unique pure Nash equilibrium is solved explicitly for the case with homogeneous customers. A general characterisation of the Nash equilibrium is provided for the heterogeneous case. It is shown that both avoid the crowd and follow the crowd behaviours are prevalent, within class types and between them. We further present a pricing mechanism that ensures the order of the accumulating priority rates in equilibrium follows a type rule and improves overall efficiency.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03575
Recommendations
- Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue
- In-queue priority purchase: a dynamic game approach
- Strategic arrivals to queues offering priority service
- Social welfare and price of anarchy in preemptive priority queues
- Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)
Cites Work
- Probability. Theory and examples.
- A course in game theory.
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
- Analysis of the Earliest Due Date Scheduling Rule in Queueing Systems
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- Dynamic scheduling with convex delay costs: The generalized \(c\mu\) rule
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Waiting time distributions in the accumulating priority queue
- Optimal Incentive-Compatible Priority Pricing for the M/M/1 Queue
- Pricing and priority auctions in queueing systems with a generalized delay cost structure
- A delay dependent queue discipline
- Time Dependent Priority Queues
- Stable priority purchasing in queues
- Decentralized Regulation of a Queue
- Purchasing Priorities in Queues
- \(S\)-modular games, with queueing applications
- Queues. A course in queueing theory
- A Dynamic Priority Queue with General Concave Priority Functions
- A Mixed Delay Dependent Queue Discipline
- Equilibrium Strategies for Processor Sharing and Random Queues with Relative Priorities
Cited In (12)
- Customer equilibrium in a single-server system with virtual and system queues
- Endogenous queue number determination in \(G/m/s\) systems
- In-queue priority purchase: a dynamic game approach
- An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue
- Charging more for priority via two-part Tariff for accumulating priorities
- The lower-class waiting time distribution in the delayed accumulating priority queue
- Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue
- Lowest priority waiting time distribution in an accumulating priority Lévy queue
- Stable priority purchasing in queues
- Priority auctions and queue disciplines that depend on processing time
- Equilibrium Strategies for Processor Sharing and Random Queues with Relative Priorities
- Strategic Equilibrium for a Pair of Competing Servers with Convex Cost and Balking
This page was built for publication: Strategic bidding in an accumulating priority queue: equilibrium analysis
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q512949)
