A theory of filtered enforcement

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1172zbMATHOpenAlexMaRDI QIDQ1601488FDO

Authors Anthony G. Heyes

Publication date 26 June 2002

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1172

zbMATH Keywords

environment regulationmonitoring and enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)

Recommendations

• Guilty until proven innocent -- regulation with costly and limited enforcement
• The use of costless inspection in enforcement
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system
• Enforcement and over-compliance

Cited in

(6)

• Enforcement and over-compliance
• The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing
• The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities
• Speed limits
• Freedom and enforcement in action. A study in formal action theory
• Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

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