A theory of filtered enforcement

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1172zbMATH Open1003.90015OpenAlexW2014768593MaRDI QIDQ1601488FDOQ1601488

Authors: Anthony G. Heyes 

Publication date: 26 June 2002

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1172

Recommendations

• Guilty until proven innocent -- regulation with costly and limited enforcement
• The use of costless inspection in enforcement
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system
• Enforcement and over-compliance

zbMATH Keywords

environment regulationmonitoring and enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)

Cited In (6)

• Speed limits
• Freedom and enforcement in action. A study in formal action theory
• The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities
• Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions
• The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing
• Enforcement and over-compliance

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