EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1997.1003MaRDI QIDQ1289649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Louis W. Nadeau

Publication date 31 May 1999

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1997.1003

zbMATH Keywords

environmental protection agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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(5)

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• Enforcement and over-compliance
• Did the EPA's voluntary industrial toxics program reduce emissions? a GIS analysis of distributional impacts and by-media analysis of substitution
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

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