The revealed preferences of state EPAs: Stringency, enforcement, and substitution

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1998.1028MaRDI QIDQ1268487zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Helland

Publication date 5 May 1999

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1028

zbMATH Keywords

budgetary pressuresClean Water Actenvironmental economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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(2)

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