On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.024zbMath1497.91074arXiv1407.5373OpenAlexW4214824246MaRDI QIDQ2155909

Christos H. Papadimitriou, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein, George Pierrakos, Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.5373

zbMATH Keywords

complexityNP-hardnessrevenue maximizationdynamic mechanism designdynamic auctionstwo-day auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (3)

Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales ⋮ Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing

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