Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion

DOI10.1007/S10683-010-9237-5zbMATH Open1231.91053OpenAlexW2035421827MaRDI QIDQ975375FDOQ975375

Authors Giorgio Coricelli, Mateus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie Claire Villeval 

Publication date 9 June 2010

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00462067/file/Neurotax.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimenttax evasiondeceptionemotionsphysiological measures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Mathematical economics (91B99) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Dynamic choice, independence and emotions
• Promises and Partnership

Cited in

(3)

• Corrupt police
• Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach
• Response times and tax compliance

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