Corrupt police
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers
- On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector
- Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
- Structural estimation of a Becker-Ehrlich equilibrium model of crime: allocating police across cities to reduce crime
- Petty corruption and citizen reports
Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion
- Conditional cooperation: review and refinement
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Cracking down on bribery
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling
- Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Cited in
(6)- The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations
- Advice to the relevantist policeman
- Crime is terribly revealing: information technology and police productivity
- On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector
- Do female officers improve law enforcement quality? Effects on crime reporting and domestic violence
- When do more police induce more crime?
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