Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.002MaRDI QIDQ2173391zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Moti Michaeli

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

costly signalinggroup formationsocial identityin-group biasPD game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Recommendations

• Reacting to unfairness: group identity and dishonest behavior
• Cheating by groups and cheating over time in surplus sharing problems
• Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
• Heterogeneity, inequity aversion, and group performance
• Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
• The rationale of in-group favoritism: an experimental test of three explanations
• Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Endogenous group formation via unproductive costs
• Evolution of Preferences1
• One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
• Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• What to maximize if you must

Cited in

(7)

• Communities and social inefficiency with heterogeneous groups
• Harsh norms and screening for loyalty
• Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
• Endogenous group formation via unproductive costs
• When are groups less moral than individuals?
• What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?
• In-group bias in prisons

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