Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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- One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
- Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
- The dynamic evolution of preferences
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- What to maximize if you must
Cited in
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- Harsh norms and screening for loyalty
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- In-group bias in prisons
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