Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating
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Publication:2173391
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.002zbMATH Open1437.91096OpenAlexW3006475492MaRDI QIDQ2173391FDOQ2173391
Authors: Moti Michaeli 
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.002
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- The dynamic evolution of preferences
- What to maximize if you must
- Evolution of Preferences1
- Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
- Endogenous group formation via unproductive costs
- One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
Cited In (7)
- Communities and social inefficiency with heterogeneous groups
- Harsh norms and screening for loyalty
- Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
- Endogenous group formation via unproductive costs
- When are groups less moral than individuals?
- What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?
- In-group bias in prisons
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