Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.010MaRDI QIDQ1036581zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florian Herold, Christoph Kuzmics

Publication date 13 November 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityobservabilitydiscriminationevolution of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• A commitment folk theorem
• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• Evolution of Preferences1
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario
• Preference evolution and reciprocity
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.

Cited in

(12)

• Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
• Evolution of preferences in multiple populations
• Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility
• Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
• Evolution of Preferences1
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
• The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices
• Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5586045 (Why is no real title available?)
• Promises and endogenous reneging costs
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games

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