Partner selection shapes the strategic and topological evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0015-6zbMath1252.91030MaRDI QIDQ692093

Faqi Du, Feng Fu

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0015-6

zbMATH Keywords

social networks; reputation; coevolutionary games; partner switching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics

91A80: Applications of game theory

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