The emergence of cooperation in the context of prior agreement with threshold and posterior compensation

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2024.128672MaRDI QIDQ6585518zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jianwei Wang, Wei Chen, Fengyuan Yu, Siyuan Zhou, Jialu He, Wenshu Xu, Wenhui Dai

Publication date 12 August 2024

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2024.128672

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary gameposterior compensationprior agreementsthreshold

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• Effects of emotion on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Realistic decision-making process with memory and adaptability in evolutionary vaccination game
• Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game
• Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The evolution of cooperation
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable

Cited in

(1)

• Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives

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