Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?

DOI10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00059-6MaRDI QIDQ2177230zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Mayuko Nakamaru, Akira Sasaki

Publication date 6 May 2020

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00059-6

zbMATH Keywords

ESShawk-dove gameresource holding potentialtransitive inference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• The evolutionary advantages of group foraging

Cited in

(8)

• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies
• An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game
• The coevolution of transitive inference and memory capacity in the hawk-dove game
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the N-person stag hunt game
• Social eavesdropping: a game-theoretic analysis
• Towards the role of social connectivity and aspiration level on evolutionary game
• Evolutionary dynamics of continuous public goods games in structured populations
• If animals know their own fighting ability, the evolutionarily stable level of fighting is reduced

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