Voting as a signaling device (Q2447162)

The authors continue the study of a model of voter behavior based on the idea that choosing to vote (or not) can influence one's later interactions with others, and thus can provide indirect benefits beyond merely the opportunity to affect the outcome of the election. (See the authors' earlier paper of the same name, [``Voting as a signaling device'', CESifo Working Paper No. 3700 (2007); \url{http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990199}] for an initial version of this model). The authors discuss some of the dynamics predicted by the model for rational actors, finding that several of the predictions agree with empirical findings. Most importantly, in this model, the paradox of not voting arises less often, since the value of voting due to signaling rises as the population increases, counteracting the loss of value that comes from having a lower chance of influencing the outcome. Under certain conditions, the model also predicts the ``bandwagon'' effect, where one's willingness to vote increases as the expected participation rate rises. The authors also discuss the impact of signaling on the volatility of voter turnout, suggesting that it is easier to increase turnout in close-knit communities where the cost of later interactions is lower, increasing their value.