Persuasion with simplistic worldviews

DOI10.1007/S11238-025-10046-YMaRDI QIDQ6898915zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Maxim Senkov, Toygar T. Kerman

Publication date 17 November 2025

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11238-025-10046-Y

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncorrelation neglectinformation designmisspecified prior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• A note on cheap talk and burned money
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Belief inducibility and informativeness
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Competition in persuasion
• Correlation neglect in belief formation
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Information hierarchies
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
• Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• Resisting persuasion
• Strategic interpretations
• The persuasion duality

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