Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41zbMath1384.03098OpenAlexW2122336644MaRDI QIDQ2971704

Adam Brandenburger, Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 7 April 2017

Published in: Readings in Formal Epistemology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Related Items (1)

Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory

Cites Work

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