Step thinking and costly coordination

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.03.032MaRDI QIDQ2442389zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Enrique Fatas, Antonio Morales

Publication date 3 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.032

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesexperimentsstep thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

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• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence

Cited in

(3)

• An experimental study of costly coordination
• Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation
• Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

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