Cycle frequency in standard rock-paper-scissors games: evidence from experimental economics

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2013.06.039zbMATH Open1402.91105arXiv1301.3238OpenAlexW2152440253MaRDI QIDQ1673261FDOQ1673261

Authors: Bin Xu, Haijun Zhou, Zhijian Wang 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a widely used model system in game theory. Evolutionary game theory predicts the existence of persistent cycles in the evolutionary trajectories of the RPS game, but experimental evidence has remained to be rather weak. In this work we performed laboratory experiments on the RPS game and analyzed the social-state evolutionary trajectories of twelve populations of N=6 players. We found strong evidence supporting the existence of persistent cycles. The mean cycling frequency was measured to be $0.029pm0.009$ period per experimental round. Our experimental observations can be quantitatively explained by a simple non-equilibrium model, namely the discrete-time logit dynamical process with a noise parameter. Our work therefore favors the evolutionary game theory over the classical game theory for describing the dynamical behavior of the RPS game.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.3238

Recommendations

• Cycles and instability in a rock-paper-scissors population game: a continuous time experiment
• Rock-scissors-paper and evolutionarily stable strategies
• Cyclic dominance in a two-person rock-scissors-paper game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47427
• Periodic attractor in the discrete time best-response dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game

zbMATH Keywords

population dynamicscyclerock-paper-scissors gameevolutionary trajectorysocial state

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• \({\mathcal Q}\)-learning
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
• Evolutionary game theory: theoretical concepts and applications to microbial communities
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Probability of second law violations in shearing steady states
• Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with logit dynamics
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Learning in games with unstable equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• What does it take to eliminate the use of a strategy strictly dominated by a mixture?

Cited In (13)

• Bifurcation analysis of the rock-paper-scissors game with discrete-time logit dynamics
• Periodic attractor in the discrete time best-response dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game
• Behavioural isomorphism, cognitive economy and recursive thought in non-transitive game strategy
• Nonlinear dynamics with Hopf bifurcations by targeted mutation in the system of rock-paper-scissors metaphor
• Ising game: nonequilibrium steady states of resource-allocation systems
• Cursed trio or fruitful triad? The case of the ``Rock-Paper-Scissors game
• Rock-scissors-paper and evolutionarily stable strategies
• Formalizing opponent modeling with the rock, paper, scissors game
• The role of pairwise nonlinear evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors game with noise
• Cyclic dominance in a two-person rock-scissors-paper game
• Cycles and instability in a rock-paper-scissors population game: a continuous time experiment
• Bifurcation analysis of three-strategy imitative dynamics with mutations
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

This page was built for publication: Cycle frequency in standard rock-paper-scissors games: evidence from experimental economics

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1673261)