Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the US
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Publication:3065355
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2010.00606.XzbMATH Open1202.91219OpenAlexW2132909974WikidataQ57547101 ScholiaQ57547101MaRDI QIDQ3065355FDOQ3065355
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