Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences (Q930485)

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scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences (English)

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Social Choice and Welfare

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publication date

30 June 2008

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0270-z

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Voting by Committees

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Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

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Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good

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Collective choice under dichotomous preferences

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A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules

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The Borda count and agenda manipulation

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Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption

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Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples

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Manipulability measures of common social choice functions

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Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1007/s00355-007-0270-z

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:930485

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