A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.04.003zbMath1232.91174OpenAlexW3124102069WikidataQ61638325 ScholiaQ61638325MaRDI QIDQ991324

Ulrich Pferschy, Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler

Publication date: 7 September 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssocial choiceminimal spanning tree

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Extremal problems in graph theory (05C35) Applications of graph theory (05C90) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Finding socially best spanning treesî ⋮ Committee selection under weight constraints ⋮ How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee? ⋮ POPULAR SPANNING TREES

Cites Work

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• Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
• Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
• Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
• Robust discrete optimization and its applications
• Approximating Min-Max (Regret) Versions of Some Polynomial Problems
• Cost allocation for a spanning tree
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• Basic Geometry of Voting

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